The Armies Approach
The Armies Approach
19th September 1643
19th September 1643
At Enborne, Essex decided as each section of the army arrived he would deploy them around the village and on Enborne Heath to present a unified defence against possible assault by Rupert’s horse regiments. Later Parliamentarian scouts were sent ahead to establish the Royalist strength and position. During discussions to decide a battle plan it was reported that: ‘When we approached within 2 miles of the town, we might discover the enemies force upon a hill; their army, having prevented us were gotten to Newbury and possessed the town.’ The Parliament scouts had been fooled into believing the whole Royalist Army was before them.
In fact the Oxford Army had not yet gathered together and were still marching the 12 miles from Wantage. What the scouts probably saw was Rupert’s advance guards consisting of Lisle’s 1,000 musketeers, formed in two brigades, in the flood plains of the valley (a mile west from Newbury bridge) occupying the enclosures either side of the lane towards Enborne village, with the horse sited in west fields behind them and in front of the town. A horse detachment was also sent to the top of Round Hill.
For Essex looking from Enborne to Newbury the hills leading to the valley were screened by the woods at Enborne (Borne Copse) therefore blocking from sight what could be the whole Oxford Army.
Although the exact positions of the armies is uncertain if we follow Parliamentarian accounts written at the time we place Rupert’s detachment between Round Hill and Crokham Heath. 2 miles away from Newbury if you use the Newtown Road via the Wash (Wash Common). This position would be an ideal location as there is no other advantage point on higher ground for Rupert to view the Enborne Road to where he knew Essex was placed.
It is plausible that Rupert used the landscape to his advantage to exaggerate the size of his available forces. Rupert’s objective would be to stall the Parliamentarian army while the Royalist army could concentrate its army.
The Royalist vanguard was in a strong position. Essex had been checked mate; with the horse detachment place on the higher ground Essex could not side step to the south. If he choose to do this then he would have to abandon his artillery taking him off track to London additionally he would have to cross the River Enbourn which would leave him extremely valuable to attack. With Lisle’s musketeers in the valley it is evident that to pass the Royalist army without offering battle opened him up to three dangers: an attack on his left flank as he passed; an assault on his rear after he had passed and/or the capture of the baggage train. To retreat back the way he had come with no food and supplies was not really an option. He had no choice but to stand and fight.
Essex whilst believing the whole Oxford army was in front of him, choose to make a half hearted attack lead by Major General Skippon on Lisle’s musketeers in the Kennet Valley. Essex was so concerned about Rupert’s detachment of horse on the higher ground that he pulled Skippon back to protect the army’s rear defences. By now it was too late in the day to deploy all the Parliamentarian regiments and Essex made no progress that day.
Leaving the forlorn hope to watch over the Royalist army the Parliamentarians withdrew. 2.5 miles west the baggage and the artillery was place on the higher ground east of Hamstead Park below Enborne Copse. The Parliamentarian army settled down for the night around Crookham Common. Hampsted was ideal to protect the Parliamentarian baggage as the Kennet protected the army to the north, Enborne Copse to the east, a natural deep ravine to the south and an irregular field system to the west.
When the King arrived in Newbury about 5pm he opened discussions with his commanders and Prince Rupert, they agreed that the Royalist army must marched with haste through Newbury to the south/west of the town were a gentle hill meets the slopes of the Wash (Enborne Road) to reinforce the Royalist vanguard.
Charles placed his headquarters in Cheap Street, that night he held a council of war. This is where the King and his commanders made one of their biggest mistakes that could have changed the outcome of the battle and the war. It was decided by his generals, Rupert, Forth and Percy that there might not even be a battle at all as it had become clear that Essex had not wanted to fight so they decided that the Royalist army would remain on the defensive forcing Essex to attack or starve.
It was decided that the majority of the horse would be moved off the higher ground and repositioned in the valley closer to Hamstead Park. The Parliamentarian camp could then keep them under observation. We will see later on that this manoeuvre was a fatal mistake.
The King had finally archived his goal of getting across the line of Essex’s retreat and during the night the Royalist army caught up and concentrated themselves. Camping in the fields below the highest view point (in the fields east of Enborne Copse) they now all waited for the dawn of the 20th September.
In fact the Oxford Army had not yet gathered together and were still marching the 12 miles from Wantage. What the scouts probably saw was Rupert’s advance guards consisting of Lisle’s 1,000 musketeers, formed in two brigades, in the flood plains of the valley (a mile west from Newbury bridge) occupying the enclosures either side of the lane towards Enborne village, with the horse sited in west fields behind them and in front of the town. A horse detachment was also sent to the top of Round Hill.
For Essex looking from Enborne to Newbury the hills leading to the valley were screened by the woods at Enborne (Borne Copse) therefore blocking from sight what could be the whole Oxford Army.
Although the exact positions of the armies is uncertain if we follow Parliamentarian accounts written at the time we place Rupert’s detachment between Round Hill and Crokham Heath. 2 miles away from Newbury if you use the Newtown Road via the Wash (Wash Common). This position would be an ideal location as there is no other advantage point on higher ground for Rupert to view the Enborne Road to where he knew Essex was placed.
It is plausible that Rupert used the landscape to his advantage to exaggerate the size of his available forces. Rupert’s objective would be to stall the Parliamentarian army while the Royalist army could concentrate its army.
The Royalist vanguard was in a strong position. Essex had been checked mate; with the horse detachment place on the higher ground Essex could not side step to the south. If he choose to do this then he would have to abandon his artillery taking him off track to London additionally he would have to cross the River Enbourn which would leave him extremely valuable to attack. With Lisle’s musketeers in the valley it is evident that to pass the Royalist army without offering battle opened him up to three dangers: an attack on his left flank as he passed; an assault on his rear after he had passed and/or the capture of the baggage train. To retreat back the way he had come with no food and supplies was not really an option. He had no choice but to stand and fight.
Essex whilst believing the whole Oxford army was in front of him, choose to make a half hearted attack lead by Major General Skippon on Lisle’s musketeers in the Kennet Valley. Essex was so concerned about Rupert’s detachment of horse on the higher ground that he pulled Skippon back to protect the army’s rear defences. By now it was too late in the day to deploy all the Parliamentarian regiments and Essex made no progress that day.
Leaving the forlorn hope to watch over the Royalist army the Parliamentarians withdrew. 2.5 miles west the baggage and the artillery was place on the higher ground east of Hamstead Park below Enborne Copse. The Parliamentarian army settled down for the night around Crookham Common. Hampsted was ideal to protect the Parliamentarian baggage as the Kennet protected the army to the north, Enborne Copse to the east, a natural deep ravine to the south and an irregular field system to the west.
When the King arrived in Newbury about 5pm he opened discussions with his commanders and Prince Rupert, they agreed that the Royalist army must marched with haste through Newbury to the south/west of the town were a gentle hill meets the slopes of the Wash (Enborne Road) to reinforce the Royalist vanguard.
Charles placed his headquarters in Cheap Street, that night he held a council of war. This is where the King and his commanders made one of their biggest mistakes that could have changed the outcome of the battle and the war. It was decided by his generals, Rupert, Forth and Percy that there might not even be a battle at all as it had become clear that Essex had not wanted to fight so they decided that the Royalist army would remain on the defensive forcing Essex to attack or starve.
It was decided that the majority of the horse would be moved off the higher ground and repositioned in the valley closer to Hamstead Park. The Parliamentarian camp could then keep them under observation. We will see later on that this manoeuvre was a fatal mistake.
The King had finally archived his goal of getting across the line of Essex’s retreat and during the night the Royalist army caught up and concentrated themselves. Camping in the fields below the highest view point (in the fields east of Enborne Copse) they now all waited for the dawn of the 20th September.
© The Newbury Battlefield Project 2009