First Encounters in Newbury
First Encounters in Newbury
The element of Essex’s army that he has sent ahead enjoyed an uninterrupted ride to Newbury. They found the townspeople welcoming and willing to help. They explained to the town’s Mayor, Gabriel Cox, of the impeding parliamentarian army and their requirements.
In the late morning Rupert’s advance guard swept down the northern end of the rain swept Northbrook Street in Newbury. They found the town and bridge at the south end of Northbrook Street unguarded, they halted in the Market Place. They requested the Mayor (a closet royalist) to meet demand that were almost identical to those of Essex’s Quartermasters but with an additional request to find accommodation for the King.
As soon as Rupert found out there were Parliamentarian soldiers in the town he gave orders to arrest them. There was a brief commotion - Rupert lead a squadron of the King’s troop and confronted them, being vastly outnumbered the Parliamentarians decided to withdraw back to Essex’s army who were 2 miles to the west between the villages of Hamstead Marshall and Enborne. They delivered the bad news, leaving seven of their quartermasters and the food preparations to be captured.
As this news reached Essex a Royalist Cavalry Regiment poured into the town followed by Lisle’s musketeers. Latter on in the afternoon they were joined by the infantry regiments. The presence of the Parliamentarian advance guard and quartermasters in the town proved to the King that Essex had planned to pass through Newbury via Reading to London. The main objective for King now was to assemble his army before Essex finally appeared.
Rupert sent scouts along the Kennet Valley to establish approximately where Essex was. It did not take them long to establish that Essex’s army was between Hamstead Marshall and Enborne.
The Parliamentarian scouts that had escaped the town found Essex with his vanguard 3 miles away on the Kintbury/Newbury road. The army came to stop with the bitter news from the quartermaster that the Royalists had occupied the town.
The reason for Essex’s failure to reach Newbury on the 19th September is perhaps the most tantalising question within the entire campaign. The Earl should have been safely in Newbury with his soldiers fed and billeted, instead he was forced to fight a battle the he had sought to avoid.
Essex had let his army dawdle, marching only 9 miles in a day, they were easily capable of covering XX miles each day. While his men slept Rupert’s horse had ridden, briefly resting at Lambourn and arriving in Newbury on the 19th September.
Written accounts of Essex’s march from Aldbourne to Newbury can be very unfair toward him. If you look at the terrain to the south of Newbury it is vastly different to that of the north where the King’s army was. Essex had to compete with streams, marshes which included short sharp gradients with brooks and hedges, back in the 17th century there were no modern drainage systems that we have today. September had been an unusually wet one the rivers ran high and the roads in the valleys where Essex was were muddy, bogging men and the baggage train down to a snail’s pace. The Royalists in contrast had the luxury of the drier higher rolling open chalk downland, obviously a quicker route.
A few common questions arise regarding Essex’s actions before the confrontation at Newbury.
Why did Essex not take precautions, like dismantling the bridge at Hungerford, a common course of action during the civil war, to protect the army’s rear?
Why did he not send dragoons ahead to secure Newbury bridge? This had been a successful tactic only a few months earlier at Caversham bridge when the King tried and failed to relieve the garrison at Reading. If Essex’s quartermasters had arrived in Newbury before the Royalist horse, so could a regiment of dragoons.
One reason may have been that he was over confident. He had brushed the Royalist horse aside at Aldbourne chase, he was convinced that there was no longer any immediate threat from the Royalists. Another reason may be faulty intelligence reports which lead him to believe that the Royalists had given up.
We may never know which theory is true but Essex appears to have been confident that Rupert was not in pursuit.
Another intelligence failure from Essex’s agents was that he was never told that Ruperts younger brother Prince Maurice was at the head of 4,000 Cornishmen and 2,000 horse, fresh from his victory in the south west, swiftly marching towards Newbury to reinforce the Oxford Army. They would be a real threat to Essex’s southern flank. If Essex was aware of their approach would he have sent out his dragoons?
In the late morning Rupert’s advance guard swept down the northern end of the rain swept Northbrook Street in Newbury. They found the town and bridge at the south end of Northbrook Street unguarded, they halted in the Market Place. They requested the Mayor (a closet royalist) to meet demand that were almost identical to those of Essex’s Quartermasters but with an additional request to find accommodation for the King.
As soon as Rupert found out there were Parliamentarian soldiers in the town he gave orders to arrest them. There was a brief commotion - Rupert lead a squadron of the King’s troop and confronted them, being vastly outnumbered the Parliamentarians decided to withdraw back to Essex’s army who were 2 miles to the west between the villages of Hamstead Marshall and Enborne. They delivered the bad news, leaving seven of their quartermasters and the food preparations to be captured.
As this news reached Essex a Royalist Cavalry Regiment poured into the town followed by Lisle’s musketeers. Latter on in the afternoon they were joined by the infantry regiments. The presence of the Parliamentarian advance guard and quartermasters in the town proved to the King that Essex had planned to pass through Newbury via Reading to London. The main objective for King now was to assemble his army before Essex finally appeared.
Rupert sent scouts along the Kennet Valley to establish approximately where Essex was. It did not take them long to establish that Essex’s army was between Hamstead Marshall and Enborne.
The Parliamentarian scouts that had escaped the town found Essex with his vanguard 3 miles away on the Kintbury/Newbury road. The army came to stop with the bitter news from the quartermaster that the Royalists had occupied the town.
The reason for Essex’s failure to reach Newbury on the 19th September is perhaps the most tantalising question within the entire campaign. The Earl should have been safely in Newbury with his soldiers fed and billeted, instead he was forced to fight a battle the he had sought to avoid.
Essex had let his army dawdle, marching only 9 miles in a day, they were easily capable of covering XX miles each day. While his men slept Rupert’s horse had ridden, briefly resting at Lambourn and arriving in Newbury on the 19th September.
Written accounts of Essex’s march from Aldbourne to Newbury can be very unfair toward him. If you look at the terrain to the south of Newbury it is vastly different to that of the north where the King’s army was. Essex had to compete with streams, marshes which included short sharp gradients with brooks and hedges, back in the 17th century there were no modern drainage systems that we have today. September had been an unusually wet one the rivers ran high and the roads in the valleys where Essex was were muddy, bogging men and the baggage train down to a snail’s pace. The Royalists in contrast had the luxury of the drier higher rolling open chalk downland, obviously a quicker route.
A few common questions arise regarding Essex’s actions before the confrontation at Newbury.
Why did Essex not take precautions, like dismantling the bridge at Hungerford, a common course of action during the civil war, to protect the army’s rear?
Why did he not send dragoons ahead to secure Newbury bridge? This had been a successful tactic only a few months earlier at Caversham bridge when the King tried and failed to relieve the garrison at Reading. If Essex’s quartermasters had arrived in Newbury before the Royalist horse, so could a regiment of dragoons.
One reason may have been that he was over confident. He had brushed the Royalist horse aside at Aldbourne chase, he was convinced that there was no longer any immediate threat from the Royalists. Another reason may be faulty intelligence reports which lead him to believe that the Royalists had given up.
We may never know which theory is true but Essex appears to have been confident that Rupert was not in pursuit.
Another intelligence failure from Essex’s agents was that he was never told that Ruperts younger brother Prince Maurice was at the head of 4,000 Cornishmen and 2,000 horse, fresh from his victory in the south west, swiftly marching towards Newbury to reinforce the Oxford Army. They would be a real threat to Essex’s southern flank. If Essex was aware of their approach would he have sent out his dragoons?
© The Newbury Battlefield Project 2009